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Abstract
In today's dynamic and highly composed environments, IT service performance and dependability assurance require efficient 
reasoning about the performance and dependability effects of faults and the countermeasures to choose, using limited knowledge. 
Model- and observation-based qualitative error propagation analysis methods can be applied to this end; however, providing support 
for the human, as well as conceptually structured machine interpretation of sets of competing error propagation hypotheses is 
an open problem. This paper proposes the application of Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) for these tasks. A natural way to represent 
error propagation hypothesis sets as formal contexts is proposed, and the visual diagnostic exploration of formal context lattices is 
introduced. On this basis, potential applications of FCA in performance and dependability assurance activities are characterized.
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1 Introduction
The capacity of IT systems to provide services at the 
agreed level of performance – commonly recorded 
in legally binding Service Level Agreements (SLAs) [1] – 
can diminish due to a range of factors. These include over-
load faults (spare capacity exhaustion), capacity reduc-
tion due to "hard" faults as node crashes, and performance 
interferences of workloads in shared resource systems [2].
The local error state effects of faults can lead to com-
ponent failures; and these failures become external faults 
of connected elements in composed systems. This way, 
error modes that are initially local to specific components 
can propagate across the topology, change their nature 
depending on the failure response of components and may 
lead to service failures.
This phenomenon of error propagation (see Fig. 1) is 
a central concept in dependable computing [3]. To prevent, 
mitigate, or at least to recover from service level failures, 
error propagation in a system has to be analyzed at design 
time and countermeasures have to be deployed in the sys-
tem. For performance failures, these mechanisms include 
admission control points and continuously maintained 
spare capacities. Active dependability mechanisms rely 
on monitoring and diagnosing the system at runtime and 
deciding on the appropriate action to take, based on poli-
cies that are derived from error propagation analysis.
In the general case, error propagation analysis prob-
lems entail a set of competing error propagation solution 
hypotheses: a set of error propagation scenarios that are all 
consistent with the underlying model. Multiple solutions 
can arise due to:
1. limited observability, 
2. nondeterministic manifestation of errors in distrib-
uted systems and 
3. limited diagnosability of the system.
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Fig. 1 The concept of error propagation in composed systems
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The efficient expert assessment and iterative refine-
ment of error propagation hypothesis sets are largely 
open problems.
This paper explores the novel application of Formal 
Concept Analysis (FCA) [4] on error propagation hypothe-
sis sets. FCA is a mathematical approach to derive concept 
hierarchies of objects, based on their shared properties; 
in the proposed application, it is used to form hierarchies 
of sets of faults, based on their commonalities in error 
propagation effects.
The lattices of fault sets which FCA creates, ordered 
by increasing / decreasing commonality in effects, enable 
an expressive visualization of error propagation hypothe-
sis sets. Visualization interactions, as relation projections 
and filterings, support visual exploration. FCA can pro-
vide a tool for:
1.  guided diagnostics, 
2. assessing the need for additional observations and 
3. hypothesis set refinements.
It will be shown that the core FCA concepts have direct 
diagnostic interpretations. This way, on the one hand, it pro-
vides a common platform to assess the results of different 
diagnostic inference approaches, and on the other hand, 
FCA itself can directly deliver diagnostic inference rules.
FCA is a proven tool in ontology engineering, both 
for creating and assessing ontologies. While the current 
paper focuses on its direct application in design for depend-
ability, it carries the promise of creating a semantic bridge 
between diagnostic inference and observations, and 
dependability knowledge and requirement modeling.
As a simple example, the paper uses a business pro-
cess model, with inference over the propagation of per-
formance errors and task-activation errors. However, the 
presented techniques are expected to efficiently support 
the qualitative performance and dependability analysis 
of Systems of Systems and Cyber-Physical Systems [5] – 
two contemporary domains where error propagation anal-
ysis with limited knowledge are key challenges.
2 Error Propagation Analysis
System-level inference over error propagation classi-
cally used such standard methods as Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). 
Today, so-called Error Propagation Analysis (EPA) 
employs more sophisticated, highly automated techniques 
that perform system-level inference using system mod-
els and component error propagation rules. The source of 
the latter can be a formal analysis of system components, 
domain expert knowledge as well as observations.
The fault (and failure) models used in EPA are typically 
based on domain-specific, standard (either actual or de 
facto) dictionaries. In composed computing systems, it is 
customary to distinguish component service timing failures 
(EARLY and LATE), value failures (SUBTLE and COARSE 
– differentiated based on detectability) and so-called "pro-
vision" failures (OMISSION and COMMISSION) [6]. It is 
also a standard technique to use multi-dimensional failure 
modes by associating, for instance, a timing, value and pro-
vision aspect with failure modes at the same time ([7] estab-
lished the basic logic of such classifications).
Purpose-built languages exist to describe the way sys-
tem components may transform their "incoming" qualita-
tive error signals into "outgoing" ones in various internal 
fault modes. The "Fault Propagation and Transformation 
Calculus" (FPTC) [8] provides a practical formalism 
in the form of (incoming pattern, outgoing pattern) com-
ponent error propagation rule clauses. The "Formalism 
for Incompletion, Inconsistency, Interference and 
Impermanence Failures" (FI4FA) [6] extends the above 
outlined taxonomy with work unit processing related fail-
ure modes, and modifies FPTC to accommodate these.
Modern EPA approaches rely on system and service 
models, reuse and compose rules describing component 
error propagation characteristics and are highly automated. 
The description of error propagation characteristics has 
been formulated as a specialization of the UML MARTE 
profile [9], partially inspired by [10]; can be consistently 
expressed through "views" in SysML (see e.g. [11]); and 
was standardized for the Architecture Analysis and Design 
Language (AADL) [12]. In a broader context, [13] presents 
an in-depth survey of the dependability modeling and anal-
ysis of software systems specified with UML. [14] defines 
an intermediate model that is applicable for a range of 
dependability analyses, including EPA.
Analytically, EPA can be approached in a number of 
fundamentally different ways. Classic models as FTA sup-
port a combinational style of modeling, which is ill suited 
for incorporating error propagation dynamics. Connected 
automata of nominal and faulty behavior can be subjected 
to model checking (as supported by, e.g., xSAP [15], and 
the COMPASS Toolset [16]), with the obvious limitations. 
One notable way for analytically resolving dynamics is 
determining the maximum possible error / failure sets 
on component connections as an EPA result, using fix-
point computations (see HiP-HOPS [17]).
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3 Modern EPA and CSP-based analysis
This paper relies on the theoretical and analytical frame-
work established by [18] and [19]. In [18], a core idea is 
that component behavior under external and internal 
faults can be represented through categorizing the devi-
ations of "actual" component input and output behaviors 
from the specified (system-wide fault-free) case. This way, 
the dynamic description of error propagation in a system 
can be performed through connected error automata.
For situations where the complexity of state-based 
analysis would be prohibitive, or propagation char-
acteristics are simply not known at such a resolution, 
this dynamic description can be compacted to so-called 
syndromes – scalar temporal abstractions of the infinite 
set of (potentially infinite) automaton input-output traces. 
This replaces the component error automata with sim-
ple relations ("static syndrome relations"), what, in turn, 
enables highly efficient analysis through finite-domain 
Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) solving.
Contemporary EPA is typically not purely forward or 
backward diagnostic reasoning, as fault impact analysis and 
fault diagnosis are at the conceptual level. Rather, the goal 
is to characterize error propagation under a set of poten-
tially mixed fault and service failure constraints, optimal-
ity objectives and decision variables (see, e.g., [20]).
An important complex use case is determining 
the dependability mechanisms that allow only a specified 
worst failure on the output, under some fault activation pat-
tern. Dependability mechanisms as "watchdog", "fail-si-
lent" or "task replication" [21] can be modelled as addi-
tional decision variables switching "on" and "off" the effect 
of their presence. CSP based analysis of EPA in the formu-
lation of [18] is able to solve for such problems [20].
However, especially in these cases, the set of error prop-
agation hypotheses can easily become unmanageable – 
not necessarily technically, but in the sense that an analyst 
will find it intractably hard to understand the logic struc-
ture and characteristics of the solution set.
As the set of all model-consistent error propagation 
hypotheses is essentially a relation over the same set of 
(component port error propagation) variables, solution sets 
can be expressed in a number of ways, from a tabular form 
to Multiple Decision Diagrams (MDD), a multi-valued 
variant of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD). As a mat-
ter of fact, constraint solving itself can be implemented 
directly over MDDs [22]; [23] proposes using such a solver 
in EPA to derive error propagation hypothesis sets, instead 
of enumerating constraint problem solutions.
In general, these representations don't lend themselves 
well to efficient human analysis. As a counterpart to 
domain-specific visualization and assessment techniques 
(as for instance qualitative error propagation covers [23]), 
subjecting error propagation hypothesis sets to FCA is 
proposed – after the minimal necessary introduction of 
the diagnostic concepts that will be used.
4 Basic diagnostic concepts
The structural granularity of an EPA model, the cover-
age of error propagation on component connections and 
the modeled resolution of faults / errors / failures all influ-
ence diagnostic resolution: the precision with which EPA 
is capable to determine the location and nature of faults 
from (the observation of) errors and failures. Too low 
a resolution leads to the use of costly overprotective 
dependability mechanisms in design and at runtime. 
The core problem is the indistinguishability of faults that 
require different treatment. At the same time, too high 
a resolution wastes resources, too, by creating and exer-
cising a diagnostic logic that is far finer than what is 
needed by the available corrective actions.
For the purposes of this paper, we define tests as mech-
anisms that binarily determine the presence or absence 
of a specific error mode on a specific component-connec-
tion in a system (system failures are errors propagating 
"out" from the system boundary). A test detects a fault, 
if its positive outcome implies the presence of a fault. 
In classic test theory, a fault jf  is said to dominate another 
fault if , if all tests for jf  also detect if . When two faults 
dominate each other, they are called equivalent [24, 25]. 
This way, tests and their combinations partition the set of 
possible faults into equivalence classes: sets of faults that 
are indistinguishable using a set of tests.
In system level diagnosis, selecting an optimal sub-
set of tests is a different problem for fault detection and 
fault localization ("diagnosis"); as detection aims at only 
determining that there is some active fault in a system, 
while localization is the problem of determining the point 
of manifestation of an active fault. Test sets can be static 
as well as dynamic – in the former case, all tests are run 
for each diagnosis, while in the latter, the outcomes of the 
already-performed tests determine the next one to run. 
For both cases, finding minimal-size optimal test sets is 
NP-hard (see, e.g., [26]), but either explicit solution is trac-
table for rough-granular models, or good heuristics exist.
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5 Formal Concept Analysis
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is a field of mathematics 
that is intimately connected to the fundamental philosoph-
ical question of "what concepts are" in human thinking and 
communication; and what "relations between concepts" 
constitute. FCA provides a formal mathematical theory of 
concepts and their hierarchies; at the same time, its tools 
and "knowledge representation" approaches are applica-
ble in a wide variety of domains. Its dominant practical 
uses are increasing human understanding; communicat-
ing concept structures and various automated concept dis-
covery and simplification tasks. In its latter roles, it's also 
a valuable tool in data mining and machine learning [27].
In FCA, a "concept" has two key parts: its extension – 
the objects "belonging to" the concept; and its inten-
sion: the set of attributes that all objects belonging to the 
concept have. Using the quasi-standard notation of the 
seminal paper of Wille [28], a formal context is a triple 
 = ( , , )G M I , where
• G  is a set of objects (Gegenstände),
• M  is a set of attributes or properties (Merkmale), and
• I  (Inzidenz) is a binary relation over these sets, 
expressing whether an object "has" an attribute or not.
Informally, a formal concept in such a formal context 
is an (O, P) set-pair of O G⊆  and P M⊆ , for which the 
object set is exactly the set of objects that share the speci-
fied properties; and conversely, the property set is exactly 
the set of properties shared by the objects.
For our purposes, it is useful to also formulate the 
notion of formal concepts in a somewhat more "object-ori-
ented" style. Based on I , let us introduce a property map-
ping: Π : 2 2G M→ , which maps each object set to the 
properties common to the objects. This mapping unam-
biguously defines the property set for a concept-forming 
object set. Then the C G⊆ 2  set of formal concept form-
ing sets contains such c Ci ∈ , where ∀ ∉ ∃ ∈o c m ci i i: ( )Π , 
so that m oi∉Π( ) ; and ∀ ∈ ∀ ∉c C m cj i j: ( )Π , it holds 
that ∃ ∈ ∉o c m oj i: ( )Π .
There is a natural subconcept-superconcept ordering 
between the concepts, by intent (or dually, extent) inclusion: 
c c c c
c c c c
c c c c
1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1
2 1 1
, ( ) , ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Π Π
Π Π
Π Π
( ) ≤ ( )
⇔ ⊆ ⇒ ⊆( )
∧ ⊆ ⇒ ⊆ 2( ).
 (1)
Informally, a subconcept is associated with a smaller 
number of objects that share across themselves a larger set 
of attributes. The set of all formal concepts for   together 
with this ordering is denoted B ( ) .
B ( )  is a complete lattice. (Note that a concept can 
be empty: either object-, or attribute-wise.) Explicit der-
ivation of B ( )  for a finite   is supported by a num-
ber of algorithms. For large contexts, approaches such 
as "Iceberg lattices" [29] are known to compute only the 
uppermost level(s) and only concepts with a large enough 
support (in the association mining sense).
The actual analysis of the formal concepts can involve 
the following key activities: 
• interactive, visual lattice exploration, 
• structure-preserving simplifications, 
• determining association and implication rules 
between the attributes, and 
• "attribute exploration".
Interactive exploration will be introduced using a simple, 
hierarchical failure abstraction example in the next section.
In the original FCA theory, two lattice structure pre-
serving (up to isomorphism) simplification operations are 
defined: clarification and reduction [30]. Clarification of 
objects and attributes is simply replacing intent-equivalent 
object sets with a single object and extent-equivalent attri-
bute sets with a single attribute, respectively.
An attribute is said to be reducible – can be eliminated 
with preserving lattice structure – if it can be replaced 
by a combination of other attributes; that is, there's a set of 
attributes for which the set of objects having these common 
attributes equals the set of objects having the attribute. 
Objects can be reduced in a similar way; the context reached 
after deleting all reducible objects and attributes is called 
the standard context (the concept lattice of which is still 
isomorphic to the concept lattice of the original context).
A minimal generator set – the Duquenne-Guigues set 
of implications – can be automatically computed for the 
deterministic attribute-implications of the formal context. 
From this generator set, all valid implications can be enu-
merated using a set of rules.
Concept lattice computation on finite contexts may work 
on a context that aims to be representative of a domain, 
but is not necessarily complete in the sense that it con-
tains all examples necessary to discover the "true" lattice 
structure valid for the whole domain. Attribute explora-
tion interactively poses a series of targeted questions to 
ensure generalized (structural) validity. A domain expert 
could answer that question with a simple "yes", or provide 
a counterexample (which is incorporated into the relation).
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6 Visual FCA by example: failure abstractions
The immediate utility of FCA, in the current domain 
as well as in others, is a kind of intelligent "knowledge 
exploration" through visual exploration, as we introduce 
it on a hierarchical failure mode abstraction example.
Fig. 2 presents a portion of a cross table of compo-
nent failures and their associated "types" at multiple lev-
els of abstraction – as could be extracted, for instance, 
from a bug tracker system. (CO denotes "COMMISSION 
or OMISSION"). The lattice structures of formal contexts 
are usually visualized using a so-called additive line dia-
gram, depicted for the cross table on Fig. 3. Each node of 
the graph represents a formal concept of the context and 
can be interpreted using two simple rules.
1. The intent of a node is the attribute(s) directly asso-
ciated with it plus all attributes that can be reached 
from it through upwards leading paths.
2. The extent of a node is the object(s) that are directly 
associated with it plus all objects from which the 
node can be reached through an upward leading path.
At the top of the diagram, there's the concept with no 
attributes and all objects; at the bottom, the concept 
with maximal intent and empty extent. The full lower half 
denotes whether a node "owns" any object; a full upper 
half whether it "owns" an attribute. Note that there are 
such unrealized concepts (no object introduced in the 
node as part of the concept extent) that also don't "define" 
an attribute directly (empty circles). In the mathematical 
sense, these are (formal) concepts, too – their associated 
extent and intent can be decoded using the above rules.
Very similarly to Exploratory Data Analysis 
(EDA) [31, 32], visual inspection of such a graph leads 
to useful observations and hypotheses. For instance, 
the CO category is mutually exclusive with the others, 
and type implications like EARLY TIMING_ERROR⇒  
become apparent.
In general, the nodes (formal contexts) enable an easy 
assessment of the failure instance coverage of each 
abstract category, the trivial structural redundancies 
in failure modes and types, and the complexity and mem-
ber-exclusivity of refinement hierarchies (trees versus 
complex bipartite graph patterns, edges leading "out" 
from a perceived hierarchy).
The main interactions with the diagram (e.g., in the 
Concept Explorer tool [33]) are the following:
1. filtering the included objects and/or attributes; and
2. highlighting concept nodes and their up/down neigh-
bors (transitively; shown later).
Filtering enables discovering the impact of adding 
and removing assumed failure modes as well as types. 
Highlighting a concept node not only helps "reading off" 
its object and property sets, but also emphasizes the mag-
nitude the subconcepts of the selected concept contribute 
to other concepts, and the adequacy of the selected con-
cept to describe its superconcepts.
Such taxonomy analysis applications of FCA 
are standard practice, for instance in ontology 
Fig. 2 Cross table: component failure modes and attributes (abbrv.)
Fig. 3 Line diagram for the lattice of failure modes and attributes
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engineering [34]. However, in the EPA context these 
techniques have direct diagnostic interpretations, too, 
with diagnostic applications.
7 Diagnostic FCA
Error propagation hypothesis sets as relations encode 
the admitted valuation-combinations of component error 
propagation port decision variables for a system (including 
fault activations). To apply FCA, objects and attributes have 
to be identified – FCA directly over the relations is nigh 
useless. The key idea here is to contrast a pair from the set 
of core dependability aspects: faults, errors / failures, and 
the application of dependability mechanisms. This paper 
explores the case when faults are the objects, and errors / 
failures / mechanism decisions the attributes; grouping 
fault activations by their increasingly common effects, thus 
enabling the diagnostic capability analysis of propagating 
errors and failures as tests. Other configurations are also 
meaningful; e.g., the faults as attributes and errors / fail-
ures as objects scoping would mainly support the evalua-
tion of fault impact magnitudes and their hierarchies.
The cross table and accompanying line graph pro-
vide a very simple example for the idea, if we assume the 
objects to be the internal fault modes of a complex compos-
ite component, and the attributes the testable service fail-
ure modes of that component on a single output. The next 
section will provide a more realistic, worked-out example 
for system level analysis with tests defined on component 
connections; however, the key insights remain the same.
Under this interpretation, the diagnostic semantics of 
visual line graph exploration and FCA can be summarized 
as presented by Table 1.
8 Theoretical justification of diagnostic FCA
Table 1 relies on equivalences between FCA and diagnos-
tic theory that require some basic justification. The current 
section provides these arguments.
Let  f F E I= ( , , )  be a formal context, where F  is 
the set of fault-activations present in an error propagation 
hypothesis set; E  the set of possible error / failure valu-
ations on each component connection; and I  the relation 
encoding the errors / failures characteristic for the differ-
ent fault activations in the error propagation hypothesis 
set. For the sake of simplicity, this section assumes that the 
relation is deterministic for the fault activations. The set 
of fault activations may, but is not required to, include the 
fault-free case. In the following it is assumed that sets of 
tests are evaluated as a conjunction for detecting faults.
Proposition 8.1. Each formal concept of  f  rep-
resents a test set and the set of equivalent faults for that 
test set. The equivalence set of faults is complete for the 
given test set, and the test set is maximal for the fault set 
in the sense that adding any further tests can only shrink 
the equivalence set covered.
The proposition does not require a formal proof, as it fol-
lows from the basic properties of formal concepts and the for-
mulation of the test notion used. For applications, some 
care may need to be exercised: the fault-free case(s) may be 
ordered in an equivalence set with "real" fault activations.
Table 1 Diagnostic interpretation of FCA visualization, 
diagram interactions and algorithms
FCA Diagnostic interpretation
Line graph interpretation (concept hierarchy)
Objects on a downward path Dominance ordering of a set of faults
Attributes on a downward path Increasing fault resolution of tests
Multiple objects belonging to 
a concept node
Faults indistinguishable with the 
currently visualized attributes
Multiple attributes belonging 
to a concept node
Tests equivalent in fault detection 
and fault resolution
Node upper and lower half full
Test directly detects one or more 
faults (resolution depends on faults 
in downward neighbors)
Only node upper half full, 
antecedents of node with 
objects don't have paths 
leading up to this level or 
higher
Test fault coverage is a combination 
of more specific tests
Only node lower half full Fully specific determination of node fault(s) requires combination of tests
Line graph interactions
Node selection and 
highlighting of upward / 
downward reachable nodes 
(see later)
A maximal effect-equivalent 
(upwards attributes) fault set 
(downwards objects). Edges leading 
out from selection inform on fault 
uniqueness to tests and individual 
test resolution for faults.
Adding / removing attributes Potentially increasing / decreasing diagnostic resolution
Adding / removing objects Effects of changing fault model and assumptions
FCA algorithms
Attribute reduction Minimal size test set without reducing diagnostic resolution
Object reduction
Minimal size representative fault 
set without eliminating propagating 
effects
Implication set Generator set for deterministic error propagation rules
Attribute exploration Methodical checking of hypothesis set completeness
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The concept order relation has an important diagnos-
tic interpretation: it directly translates to fault dominance.
Proposition 8.2. The order of B( ) f  is a fault dom-
inance relation in the sense that ∀ ∈ <c c c ci j f i j, ( ),B   
implies that the test set of ic  is also a test set for all 
faults in jc .
For the ordering to hold, the definition requires 
the smaller concept to have attributes that are strictly 
a subset of those of the larger one (and exactly reverse 
for the objects). This means that the smaller concept dom-
inates the larger by detecting a larger set of faults, using 
a common subset of test attributes.
The higher fault detection power of well-chosen, 
smaller sets of attributes is entirely in line with the basic 
logic of system level test and diagnosis [35]. Detecting the 
mere presence of an otherwise unidentified fault activation 
from a set of fault activations requires testing for the "most 
common properties" of the fault activations. Conversely, 
determining the location of the fault, up to the resolution 
that is practical for repair actions, requires identifying 
the "uncommon" (i.e., distinguishing) fault effect features 
within a set of fault activations.
Proposition 8.3. Attribute reduction of clarified con-
texts creates a minimal test set for fault localization with 
the maximum possible resolution.
As a proof, we can call on the dominance-interpretation 
of the order relation to show that if a test set is minimal, 
then it's a reduced attribute set; and if an attribute set is 
reduced, then it defines a minimal test set.
Minimality of the test set means that taking away any of 
the tests, at least two distinguishable faults would become 
indistinguishable. In other words, taking away any attri-
bute creates a concept lattice where at least two objects 
that previously were present at least in two different con-
cepts are now only elements of the same concepts.
Removal of an attribute from a context can only 
force each existing concept to merge with others or stay 
unchanged – no "new" concept will be formed, as a new 
(not produced by mergers) concept would mean that 
we now distinguish an object set with a maximum com-
mon attribute set that we did not distinguish before; and if 
we only delete an attribute, then there's no reason for any 
such concept not be present in the original context. And if 
only mergers and non-changes are possible, two objects 
previously elements of at least two different concepts 
becoming part only of the same concepts means that 
the number of concepts has to be smaller than originally.
But in this case, taking away an attribute cannot be done 
without changing the lattice structure. As it is a property 
of reducible attributes that their removal does not change 
the lattice structure, there is none of them; meaning that 
the lattice is not further attribute-reducible.
In the other direction, a reduced attribute set means that 
no test is equivalent to a combination of other tests; there's 
no test the fault equivalence set of which could be exactly 
created as an intersection of the fault equivalence sets of 
other tests. Any combination either includes further ele-
ments, and thus the test contributes additional fault local-
ization; or leaves one or more faults out, and thus the test 
contributes fault detection.
Proposition 8.4. The minimal set of implications 
(Duquenne-Guigues set of implications) acts as a gener-
ator set (using, e.g., the Armstrong rules) for the deter-
ministic error propagation rules and cross-input / output 
port value combination correspondences in the system. 
The implications have general validity for the fault acti-
vation set at hand.
Again, this proposition holds through a diagnos-
tic interpretation of the general-purpose FCA construct. 
Due to the construction and meaning of the elements of 
the formal context, any attribute implication either
1. describes direct or indirect forward propagation;
2. describes direct or indirect "backward propagation";
3. establishes implication in the input or the output port 
set of some component; or
4. establishes an implication between two ports not 
connected through error propagation.
As implications can be categorized mechanically based 
on the error propagation component model, the rule-subset 
membership of any base or derived implication is trivially 
decidable. Multiple fault activations taken into account may 
suppress otherwise deterministic propagation rules by mak-
ing propagation seemingly nondeterministic; in this repre-
sentation fault activation is encoded in the objects, so the 
difference in output for a component port due to an activated 
internal fault will manifest through the absence of certain 
attribute implications due to outcome-ambiguity.
However, FCA is not expected to directly support error 
propagation reasoning by creating propagation rules or 
minimalizing propagation characteristics at the system 
level. Rather, it may prove to be a useful tool for experts 
to check the validity of propagation rules, especially when 
performed for components fault mode-wise.
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9 A business process EPA example
For demonstration purposes, a simple business process 
example using the EPA approach of [18] is presented.
The modeling and analytic method has a number of direct 
antecedents. Based on [36], [18] describes mathematically 
precise, data flow network based EPA of business processes, 
using early modeling notations. [37] refined the approach for 
Business Process Model and Notation (BMPN 2) [38] mod-
els. [39] introduced a problem modularization approach for 
EPA that the example applies at the implementation level. 
Relatedly, [40] discusses the impact of error refinement and 
nondeterminism elimination on the specificity and level of 
pessimistic overabstraction of the analysis results.
While this work focuses on the qualitative evaluation of 
business process models, it has to be noted that the quan-
titative model-based dependability and performance 
analysis of business processes has quite a rich literature; 
see e.g. [41] and [42].
Fig. 4 depicts the simple example business process 
model used here. The process – adapted from a real-life 
example – describes the steps taken during initial appli-
cation for a loan. While BPMN supports constructs to 
express data dependencies and data flows between activ-
ities (such as data objects), in order to keep the example 
simple only the control flow aspect is expressed.
It is also assumed that all activities are implemented 
by IT resources that can fail, but are dedicated (that is, 
activities don't have common mode faults). The "Manual 
check" step is an exception; it is assumed not to be influ-
enced by resources. (Although not discussed here, resource 
dependencies can be integrated directly into the model 
and used for EPA – see, for instance, [37].)
Fault activation patterns are restricted to resource 
faults; activity implementation faults and execution engine 
faults are assumed not to be present. These would only add 
unnecessary complexity to the example.
For EPA, BPMN elements as well as resources are 
mapped to a network of error propagation compo-
nents, with a number of input / output error port types 
(see Fig. 5). Port types have associated error mode dic-
tionaries, as shown by Fig. 5. Splitting data and activa-
tion (provision) + timing reflects the way BPMN pres-
ents data and control flow – that is, using two intertwined 
dependency graphs. The error mode INACTIVE is 
included to differentiate the case when a workflow ele-
ment is "correctly inactive" – e.g., because it belongs to 
an execution path that's avoided due to choices in exclu-
sive gateways. A component can use resources and in turn, 
(OK,OK)
(OK,OK)
(INACTIVE,NA)(OK,OK)
(INACTIVE,NA)(OK,OK)
(OK,OK)
(OK,OK)
(OMISSION,NA)
(OK,OK)(OK,LATE)
(OK,LATE)
(OK,LATE)
(INACTIVE,NA)
(OK,LATE)
Resource 
crashed
(OK,LATE)
(OK,LATE) (OK,LATE)
(INACTIVE,NA)(INACTIVE,NA)
Fig. 4 An example business process model, annotated with a particular 
error propagation hypothesis
ComponentA_IN A_OUT
D_IN D_OUT
Activation error modes
Presence dimension: 
OK/INACTIVE/OMISSION/COMMISSION
Timing dimension: 
OK/EARLY/LATE/NA
Resource error modes
OK/CRASHED/OVERLOADED
Data flow error modes
OK/COARSE/SUBTLE
F_IN
Internal fault mode
NO_FAULT/FAULTY
R_IN R_OUT
Fig. 5 Error propagation component model
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act as a resource; the resource error modes used here are 
CRASHED and OVERLOADED. Components may also 
have internal faults under a binary fault model.
The component model is specialized for the three types 
of resource-extended BPMN model elements used here.
• BPMN elements map to error propagation compo-
nents with a 1:1 mapping of modeled relationships to 
activation and data input / output error ports.
• Tasks – roughly, the "actual steps" of the process that 
perform the orchestrated business activities – also 
have a resource error mode input port. Data error 
flow is unutilized in the example.
Thirdly, resources are simply components that have 
an internal fault mode and a resource error mode out port.
The basic logic of error propagation model translation 
to mathematical representation for CSP is the following 
(the example does not require explicit temporal compac-
tion through syndromes).
1. Component ports are mapped to decision vari-
ables with a finite domain corresponding to 
their port-dictionaries.
2. The process and resource topology is mapped 
into equality constraints on port-variable pairs.
3. Input-output port variable constraints express 
the error propagation (transformation) rules 
for each component.
Propagation rules for non-task BPMN elements are 
straightforward and reusable. The same holds for the 
"default" rule sets of tasks – although some cases need 
careful consideration. For instance, a CRASHED exe-
cution resource transforms an incoming COMMISSION 
activation error mode to INACTIVE, and not OMISSION.
The default model includes a number of nondeter-
ministic choices; e.g., by default, a task-internal fault 
can cause almost any outgoing error modes (notably, not 
COMMISSION). For individual tasks, the rules can be 
refined, made more deterministic, or even replaced.
10 Exploratory analysis of hypothesis sets
As a propagation example, consider the error propagation 
annotation on Fig. 4, a single error propagation hypoth-
esis solution to the problem of "the resource under the 
business registry check activity is CRASHED and all 
other resources remain OK". Such a (single) solution is 
easily tractable. However, this is not the only solution 
of this problem. On one hand, there are those solutions 
where execution simply steers clear of the crashed 
resource – through a different, in our data-omitting case 
nondeterministic, choice on the first or second exclusive 
gateway. On the other hand, the last exclusive gateway 
"doubles" each solution "unnecessarily"; from the point 
of view of system-level effects, it's largely unimportant 
which branch the execution chooses there.
It is important to note the way this style of error 
propagation analysis (in a broader sense, disturbance 
effect propagation analysis) can efficiently blend infer-
ence over distinct, but interconnected service assurance 
domains. In the example, the engagement of the watch-
dog-like dependability mechanism, while providing tol-
erance against a "hard" fault, also has a performance 
impact; that is, the experienced delay will increase. 
Similarly, solving for an overloaded resource for the 
"Check business registry" step will lead to a propagat-
ing OK, but LATE activation. At the same time, there are 
business process tasks that can "transform back" a propa-
gating error that is purely a performance issue to one that 
falls under classic dependability (or performability) con-
cerns. An example is activating a task LATE that is bound 
to a specific deadline.
Fig. 6 presents the line diagram for the resulting error 
hypothesis set under the constraint that zero or one resource 
faults may be present ("multiple instantiation" of faults is 
due to the fact that the activation of a specific fault can 
nondeterministically cause different outcomes). The dia-
gram is a projection for the input of the "Stop" event (fail-
ure types) and the input errors of the confluence element 
of the "Checked earlier?" choice gateway (identified by the 
CH4 prefix, denoting the fourth "choice" element in the 
model). The latter "probing point" has been selected purely 
as an example; in practice, much larger diagrams can be 
well assessed than what can be presented here (and the fil-
tering of variables would focus on field replaceable units 
and elements with applicable dependability mechanisms; 
an aspect that this paper does not address).
The selection leading to the highlighting on the fig-
ure has been performed on the node of the "STOP_IN_T_
LATE" label (timing input port of the "Stop" component 
being evaluated to LATE) – that is, we are looking at the 
(pure) performance failures at the system level.
The reading of the diagram is the following. 
"Upwards", late execution at the end of the process entails 
only execution correctly reaching the "Stop" stage – maybe 
not interestingly, but reassuringly. "Downwards", the 
paths identify that 
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• the "late" nature of system-level behavior is asso-
ciated either with one of the inputs of CH4 being 
late, or the latency introduced later in the process 
(in an XOR manner); and 
• the possible resource fault activations leading to the 
late activation at the stop event – and these don't 
include the "no fault" cases.
In general, line diagrams make the fault-localization 
capability of the (full) intent of any node easy to visu-
ally assess. Furthermore, nodes with an owned attribute 
express a "most specific" fault-localizing attribute that 
makes the "upward" elements of the full intent superfluous 
to distinguish its extent from the remainder. Regarding the 
full context, line diagrams visually represent the fault 
equivalence classes of the finest granularity possible under 
the current (filtered) error / failure set; and the hierarchy of 
tests that make them increasingly distinguishable.
The exploration made possible by interactive filtering 
and highlighting not only enables the agile, visual assess-
ment of pre-designed fault detection and localization 
attribute sets, but also helps in expert monitoring feature 
selection when it is impractical to formalize all important 
feature selection preferences.
11 Use cases for FCA in EPA
Two fundamental use cases categories of FCA in depend-
ability and performance assurance are apparent: support-
ing dependability and performance assurance planning 
and application for ontology design.
For the first use case, Fig. 7 presents an overview of the 
techniques that the previous sections introduced. The fun-
damental idea here is that the visualization capabilities 
and algorithms for various simplifications in FCA can pro-
vide a unique insight into the models, analysis and plan-
ning artifacts at each stage of the workflow.
For visual interpretability, context sizes have to be 
kept moderate, thus projections have to be performed 
for human processing; however, this is not a major prob-
lem, as the human analyst is generally interested in vali-
dation and taking major design decisions at a low struc-
tural resolution (as intended error containment regions, 
replaceable / repairable components, or major functional 
blocks). Also, dedicated domain-specific algorithms 
(especially practice-proven intelligent heuristics) in the 
Fig. 6 Fault activation instance and error / failure port valuation formal 
context, with filtering and interactive selection
MDD-based 
hypothesis set 
derivations
Error 
propagation 
model
Engineering 
model
Diagnostic and test 
plans
Validate constraint and 
propagation logic
Dependability and 
performance mechanism 
candidates
Avoidance, mitigation 
and repair action 
candidates
Validate propagation 
covers
Propagation logic 
simplification
Expert design of rough 
granular mechanisms 
and diagnosis
Validation, candidate 
comparison
Dependability and performance 
assurance planning
FCA-based 
exploration and design
Component-
wise
Filtered to 
rougher 
resolutions
Fig. 7 Applications of FCA in assurance planning
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planning workflow can be expected to have much more 
favorable computational complexity characteristics then 
the exact FCA algorithms. (Although it is an open ques-
tion, whether the statement holds for FCA heuristics and 
partial context computation algorithms.)
At the same time, for error propagation models, propaga-
tion hypothesis sets, test plans, etc., FCA carries the prom-
ise to serve as a bridge between automated model building 
and the human expert – the very same way as EDA does 
for statistical modelling and hypothesis testing. In EDA 
as well as here, visualizations and descriptive abstractions 
don't serve to replace sophisticated algorithms, but to effi-
ciently reach hypotheses, check a wide range of (implicit) 
assumptions and validate modelling results.
The second major category is ontology building. 
Formal concepts in general are recognized as an efficient 
tool for identifying concepts and relations for ontologies 
from data, as well as for merging and completing them 
(e.g. through attribute exploration) [43, 44].
There are established approaches to express core con-
cepts, requirements and their relationships in depend-
ability and performance (for dependability see e.g. [45]; 
specifically for workflow performance, [46]); however, 
these tend not to fully utilize the potential of ontologies. 
Recently, [47] introduced an ontology that explicitly cap-
tures fault-failure mechanisms and severities (through 
concepts, relationships and the use of description logic) 
and uses FMEA to determine them.
As it has been directly shown here, FCA is capa-
ble to characterize, partition and order faults by their 
effects – and the same is true in reverse, for failures 
through fault-attributes (cross table transposition is a 
standard FCA technique; regarding the diagnosis and test 
interpretation, similar results can be derived). This way, 
FCA supports deriving the fault and failure hierarchies 
and relationships that emerge from data – in the here dis-
cussed case from computed error propagation hypothesis 
sets, but the same holds for (classified / quantized) exper-
imental and monitoring data. For an existing ontology 
capturing fault types through their effects, it also enables 
checking the effect-wise equivalence or compatibility of 
observed effects with pre-modelled ones, and checking 
the ontology for completeness and freedom from (formal) 
conceptual redundancy.
More generally, FCA is also capable to hierarchically 
conceptualize error propagation behaviors (e.g. through 
their error containment / creation or dampening / amplifi-
cation capability attributes) and error mitigation require-
ments, opening up the possibility for data-driven, rich 
semantic support of all major qualitative aspects of design 
for dependability and performance. Future research will 
target these challenges.
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